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The American Supreme Court is currently ill-equipped to confront populism. This is not because of the political
balance between justices nominated by Republican Presidents and those nominated by Democrat Presidents. It
is a result of a deeper shift in the way the concept of judicial legitimacy is currently understood in the US. In this
post I will briefly present this shift that I analyzed in length in a series of articles.
The introduction of public opinion polling that measured public support for the Court meant that for the first time
in American history, the elected representatives lost their monopoly on the claim to legitimacy based on public
support. Until the invention of public opinion polls, no source of data could give direct, regular, and reliable
measurements of public opinion apart from elections.1)See Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg, Kent L. Tedin,
American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact (2nd edition, Wiley 1980). Public opinion polls
introduced for the first time in history an independent source of evidence, considered reliable by all relevant
players, of public support for the Court.
One may think that opinion polling is a sham; that it constructs public opinion more than merely measuring it,
and yet several decades of constant polling reshaped the notion of democratic legitimacy in the US. Since the
1980s and the rise of ‘public opinion culture’, the term ‘public opinion’ came to be synonymous with opinion polls
results.2)See, e.g., George F. Bishop, The Illusion of Public Opinion (Rowman and Littlefield 2005) 6; Susan
Herbst, Numbered Voices (University of Chicago Press 1993) 63. Opinion polls have served in the public
discourse as an authoritative democratic legitimator.3)See Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the
American Republic (Harvard University Press 2010) 75–6; Sarah E. Igo, The Averaged American  (Harvard
University Press 2007) 12–13, 18–19. Between elections, political players rely heavily on these polls in deciding
on their positions. The entrance of public opinion polls as a reliable metric, measuring the Court’s public
confidence and demonstrating it publicly, made it possible to view the Court’s legitimacy in terms of public
support for the first time in history. This shift brought changes in the institutional dynamic between the branches
of government and in the Court’s jurisprudence.4)For a discussion of these changes see Or Bassok, The
Supreme Court’s New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. (2013) 153. Not less importantly, the shift
brought significant changes in the concepts the legal community uses to understand the Court’s legitimacy.
The Conceptual Shift in American Constitutional Thinking
Two prominent manifestations of the conceptual shift following the introduction of polls are the shift in how
Alexander Hamilton’s famous dictum in Federalist No. 78 is read, and the shift in what the countermajoritarian
difficulty means. I will briefly present these two manifestations.
Currently, Americans read Hamilton’s dictum that the judiciary “truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but
merely judgment” in a manner that seem to them as identical to Hamilton’s intention, but reflects a deep change
in the understanding of judicial legitimacy. For them, without the force or will, all the Court has is “public
confidence.” As I explain in a recent article, this way of reading – that rose together with the entrance of public
opinion polls – reflects that rather than seeing the Court’s legitimacy as emanating from its judgment (expertise),
Americans now view it as stemming from public support.5)Or Bassok, The Supreme Court at the Bar of Public
Opinion Polls, 23 Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory (2016) 573.  While in
the past the view was that the government as a whole requires public support, but not individual institutions. Now
things have changed with regards to the SC (but not with regards for the Federal Bank).6)See, e.g., The
Federalist No. 39 as well as No. 49.  See also Owen M. Fiss, Foreward: The Forms of Justice , 93 Harv. L. Rev.
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(1979) 1, 38
Most of the time, American judges, lawyers and scholars do not even notice this change in reading the Federalist
No. 78. They use the paraphrased version of the Federalist No. 78 and its original version interchangeably. This
shift is evident in judgments of justices irrespectively of the political affiliation of the President that nominated
them to the Court. Take for example Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges (the Gay
marriage case). In this judgment, Roberts used the Federalist No. 78 twice in discussing the Court’s legitimacy:
first in its original version and then, by quoting Justice Kennedy, in its paraphrased version. But at times,
Americans do notice that they are paraphrasing. A prominent example is Pamela Karlan’s concluding lines in her
2012 Harvard Foreword titled Democracy and Disdain.7)Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term,
Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 Harv. L. Rev. (2012) 1, 71. Karlan writes that “Alexander Hamilton was
slightly off base when he wrote that the judiciary has ‘neither Force nor will but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.’ The judiciary must
ultimately depend on the people.”8)Ibid., 71. In other words, Karlan views public support as the Court’s source of
legitimacy. According to this understanding of judicial legitimacy, even if the Court lacks expertise, as long as it
holds public support, it will function properly.
The shift in understanding the countermajoritarian difficulty is even harder to detect. The name of the difficulty –
coined by Alexander Bickel – reads as if it was devised precisely for the age of public opinion polling: the
counter-majoritarian difficulty (hereinafter: the CM difficulty). On its face, the CM difficulty seems to deal with the
Court countering the majority of the public as reflected in public opinion polls. But while this is the current
dominant understanding of the difficulty, it was not the original meaning of the difficulty. When coining this term,
Bickel intended to capture the difficulty of remotely accountable judges that have the authority to invalidate
legislation enacted by electorally accountable representatives. Bickel did not understand the difficulty in terms of
the Court countering public opinion for the simple reason that at the time of coining the concept, public opinion
polls had yet to attain their current status in the public discourse as reliable reflections of popular sentiment. For
this reason, Bickel could still write that “[s]urely the political institutions are more fitted than the Court to find and
express an existing consensus – so long, at least, as the science of public sampling is no further developed than
it is.”9)Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: the Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Bobbs-
Merrill 1962), 239.
For Bickel the CM difficulty was unsolvable. The American SC is inherently less accountable than the elected
institutions since the Justices’ time in office in not directly controlled by the public. For this reason, the only path
to deal with the difficulty is to try and justify the Court’s function based on judicial expertise. It is no wonder then
that under this Bickelian paradigm, the American constitutional discourse was for many years obsessed with
finding expertise-based justifications for the Court’s CM authority of judicial review over legislation. However,
with the rise of public opinion polling, the difficulty has changed its meaning. Currently, the difficulty pertains to a
court that its decisions counter the views of the public as expressed in opinion polling.10)Or Bassok, The Two
Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 32 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. (2012) 333. Subsequently, Nathaniel Persily could
write that “[a]fter all, if the Court merely reflected public opinion in its decisions, then whatever other problems it
might have, it could not be described as countermajoritarian.”11)Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to Public Opinion
and Constitutional Controversy (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Critin & Patrick J. Egan, eds., Oxford University Press,
2008) 5.
A cottage industry has developed in political science journals in which it is demonstrated, using opinion polling
data, that the American SC is not CM. For decades now political scientists have been gloating: they have proven
that the entire legal academia has been engaged in confronting a difficulty that does not exist. But obviously a
court that its judgments correspond to public opinion results remains unaccountable and in that sense the CM
difficulty in its original sense is still insolvable. Political scientists are just viewing the Court’s legitimacy problem
through their limited working tool: public opinion polls.
Two Points of Clarification
A. The American Supreme Court has always understood its legitimacy as dependent of
2/5
public support
Barry Friedman has made implicitly the strongest case for this claim in his excellent account of the influence of
public opinion on the Court throughout its history. In his book The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has
Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution,12)Barry Friedman, The Will of the
People (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2009). Friedman retells the entire history of the Supreme Court based on the
premise that in order to function properly the Court requires public support. The story according to Friedman is
one of a structurally unchanged relationship between public opinion and the Court. In essence, according to his
account, judicial legitimacy was always understood in terms of public opinion, the only change is that with time
the justices have become better in assessing public opinion.13)Friedman, supra n 12, at 376. True, long before
the invention of public opinion polls, the Court was interested in public opinion and even spoke of its “public
confidence.” Yet, I argue that while public opinion has undoubtedly affected the Court throughout its entire
history, the introduction of public opinion polls changed the institutional dynamics as well as the understanding of
concept such as “judicial legitimacy” or “public confidence.” This new understanding has manifestations such as
the change in reading the Federalist No. 78 or in the understanding of the CM difficulty. Friedman, so I argue,
viewed the entire history of the Court through these conceptual “glasses” of the present.14)For my critique of his
account see Bassok, supra n. 4, at 192-3.
If this argument seems hard to swallow think of the claim that a non-democratic ruler (think of Mubarak) requires
public support to rule. For the people under his rule, this is clearly untrue. Non-resistance is not necessarily a
result of oppression. Rather, the state of things may just seem natural. In fact, the moment the people put the
“glasses” that make them realize that the ruler requires their support to rule is the moment of the ruler demise.
Similarly, we can think of institutions in a democracy that their expertise is so obvious to us (central banks?) that
we do not view them as requiring public support.
True, changes in the manner the Court views legal expertise and public opinion were not only the result of the
introduction of public opinion polls, but also the result of the decline of the belief in legal expertise in constitutional
questions.15)Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L. and Pol. 239 (2011). And yet, the effect of
the technological change in measuring public support on the Court has not been detected by Friedman and
others who analyzed the relationship between the Court and the public.
B. Other courts worldwide speak “in the name of the people”
In an innovative book titled “In the Name of the People,” Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke discuss the
formula “in the name of the people,” used by domestic courts to describe “in whose name” they decide
cases.16)Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name?: A Public Law Theory of International
Adjudication  20 & fn. 94-95 (Oxford University Press 2014).  The authors explain that this formula invokes the
authority of the democratic sovereign.17)Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation
of International Courts' Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 Eur J. Int’l L. 7, 7-8 (2012).  Yet von
Bogdandy and Venzke make it clear that this expression is a reflection of an older concept of popular sovereignty
that is detached from the actual public support of the here and now as measured in public opinion polls.18)See
von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra n. 15, at 20. It is a concept that views the democratic subject as a single
collective, mostly a nation or a people, rather than the accumulation of individual voices.19)See von Bogdandy &
Venzke, supra n. 15, at 140. This is very different from the understanding of public confidence as reflecting public
opinion measured by public opinion polls. While the American new understanding of judicial legitimacy has
undoubtedly started to migrate to other jurisdictions,20)See Or Bassok, Two Concepts of Judicial Legitimacy, in
Martin Scheinin, Helle Krunke & Marina Aksenova eds., Judges as Guardians of Human Rights and
Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 50-70. the German Constitutional Court’s use of the phrase “in
the name of the people” (a use that stems from Article 25(4) of the German Law on the Federal Constitutional




The introduction of public opinion polls that measure public support for the Court is responsible, at least in part,
for a change in understanding judicial legitimacy. These days, to claim that the court is legitimate in the US is to
claim it holds public support.21)see for example Jeffery Rosen, The Supreme Court Has a Legitimacy Crisis, But
Not For the Reason You Think, The New Republic, June 11, 2012 While this shift does not mean necessarily
that the Court has to follow public opinion in every case,22)See for example the discussion of why originalism
has become so prominent in the Court’s jurisprudence in Or Bassok, The Court Cannot Hold, 30 J.L. & Pol.
(2014) 1, 39-40. the claim that a legitimate Supreme Court can somehow confront over a long period of time a
populist movement supported by public opinion is under this new conceptual array a contradiction in terms. This
result is not because of the inherent “truth” that no court can function without public confidence. This “truth” was
never proven by political scientists. In fact, there is at least one case that refutes it.23)See Or Bassok, South
African Constitutional Doctors with Low Public Support, 30 Constitutional Commentary (2015) 521. This result is
one consequence of deserting the Hamiltonian understanding of judicial legitimacy following the rise of opinion
polling. Only if we read the Federalist No. 78 as saying that all the Court has merely public confidence, then it
cannot oppose the public.
I thank Shay Levi for his valuable comments to an earlier draft.
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